

# BORDER EXTERNALIZATION AND MIGRATION CONTROL IN SENEGAL: RISKS FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION



**CEA(R)**

Comisión Española  
de Ayuda al Refugiado

This report has been drawn up by the advocacy area at the Spanish Commission for Refugees (CEAR) in the context of the '**Observatory on the right to asylum, forced migrations and frontiers**' project funded by the Extremadura Agency for International Development Cooperation (AEXCID)

Durante la investigación y con el objetivo de analizar el impacto de las políticas de During the research and in order to make an analysis of the impact of externalization of borders and cooperation for development linked to migratory control in Senegal, the CEAR team held meetings and interviews with ActionAid Senegal, Alianza por la solidaridad Senegal, Amnesty International- Senegal, Asamblea Cooperación por la Paz-Senegal, Augusto Delkáder (researcher UCM), CONCORD- Action Aid-Italy, CONGDE, CEAR Canarias, EUROMED-RIGHTS, EUTF, FIIAPP, Government of Canary Islands, Hahatay Sonrisas de Gandiol, IRIDIA, José Naranjo (journalist on El País), Lorenzo Gabrielli (professor Univ. Pompeu Fabra Barcelona), MAUC, IOM-Senegal, Spanish Labor, Migration and Social Security Office in Senegal, Spanish Cooperation technical office (OTC) in Senegal, OXFAM-INTERMON, REMIDEV and migrants or asylum seekers, to whom CEAR thanks their contributions to conduct this report.

Front page photo:  
Children playing in Ngor, Dakar (Senegal) © EFE/Nic Bothma

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The Spanish Commission for Refugees (CEAR) is a non-profit organization founded in 1979 that is engaged in voluntary, humanitarian, independent and joint action. Our aim is to work together with citizens to defend the right to asylum. Our mission is to champion and promote human rights and comprehensive development for asylum applicants, refugees, stateless people and migrants in a vulnerable situation or at risk of social exclusion. Our work takes a comprehensive based on temporary accommodation; legal, psychological and social assistance; training and employment; and social advocacy and participation

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## List of Acronyms

**AECID:** Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation

**ODA:** Official Development Assistance

**AOTDS/TOSSD:** Total Official Support for Sustainable Development

**ASND:** National Agency of Statistics and Demography of Senegal

**CEAR:** Spanish Commission for Refugees

**ECOWAS-CEDEAO:** Economic Community of West African States

**PCD:** Policy coherence for development

**AU:** African Union

**EDF:** European Development Fund

**ENI:** European Neighbourhood Instrument

**INE:** National Institute of Statistics

**CPF:** Country Partnership Framework

**IOM:** International Organization of Migrations

**OOF:** Other Official Flows

**NGO:** Non-governmental Organization

**OTC:** Spanish Cooperation technical office

**UNDP:** United Nations Development Programme

**UNHCR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**EPA:** Economic Partnership Agreement

**EU:** European Union

**FIIAPP:** International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies

**GAMM:** Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

**ICOMIX I:** Joint mixed Commission Spain-Senegal (2009-2012)

## 1. Introduction

For years, Senegal has been a priority partner in Spanish and European foreign policy. Considered by the EU and Spain an ‘example of democratic governance in the region’<sup>1</sup>, they share intense relations of support and collaboration with the country, bringing together mutual interests<sup>2</sup>.

In the case of Spain, cooperation with Senegal grew more intense after the so-called Cayucos crisis<sup>3</sup> in 2006. Since then, an extensive repertoire of political and legal instruments has been developed, as well as operational and technical cooperation agreements aimed mainly at containing migration flows to prevent arrivals to the EU and implement expulsion, readmission and return measures.

Given this context, and in line with its objective to defend human rights and the right to asylum, the Spanish Commission for Refugees (CEAR) conducted an investigation in 2021 as part of the ‘Observatory on the right to asylum, migrations and borders’ project. The study aimed to analyse the impact of border externalisation and conditional development cooperation policies in priority transit countries (Mauritania, Senegal and Algeria) on Spanish migration, asylum and development cooperation policies. The work was carried out based on the analysis and review of bibliographic sources and interviews with various key actors in development cooperation, migration and asylum in Europe and Senegal, as well as Senegalese migrants.

## 2. Context

Senegal is a presidential republic that follows the French political/administrative model. It has many characteristics (international participation, regional leadership, geo-strategic position, trade possibilities, etc.) that motivate the EU, Spain and other Member States to cooperate with it.

It is bordered by Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. Its population is estimated at approximately 16,705,608 inhabitants<sup>4</sup>. French is the official language and Wolof is the national language, in addition to other local languages.

Since its independence from France in 1958, there have been no coups in Senegal, in contrast to other countries in the region. Democracy has been maintained over the years, with ups and downs and social tension mainly related to corruption<sup>5</sup>.

The most significant internal conflict broke out in the 1980s in the Casamance region, which aspired to autonomy. The conflict resulted in more than 60,000 internally displaced people<sup>6</sup>. Although this number has decreased since 2016 when there were 24,000 displaced people, in 2020 there were still 8,400<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> European Commission, (2016) “European Union’s Development Cooperation with Senegal” [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO\\_16\\_1576](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_1576)

<sup>2</sup> Interests that include geopolitical influence, migration control, economics, trade, etc.

<sup>3</sup> In 2006, 31,678 people arrived to the Canary Islands from Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco. This unprecedented figure marked a turning point in bilateral relations between Spain and Senegal.

<sup>4</sup> The National Agency of Statistics and Demography of Senegal (ANSD). <http://www.ansd.sn/index.php>. Accessed 04/03/2021.

<sup>5</sup> Including relatively recent tension, such as in 2012 to prevent the re-election of President Wade and in March 2021 against the current President Sall, due to the persecution of the opposition leader Sonko.

The corruptions perceptions index rose especially in 2012. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL. Corruption Perceptions Index. <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/sen>

<sup>6</sup> África Renewal (2005). Peace pact raises hope in Senegal. <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2005/peace-pact-raises-hope-senegal>

<sup>7</sup> ACNUR. Refugee Data Finder. IDP. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=n2ma4P>

While Senegal has seen some economic growth in recent years, poverty levels remain high, ranking at the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Index<sup>8</sup>.

Regarding international development cooperation, it is important to note that it is a considerable source of income for the country, which is why Senegal takes care of its relations and seeks to maintain and diversify its international donors.

In terms of migration, the common trends seen in other West African countries also apply to Senegal, with there being multiple types of migration taking place. On the one hand, it has traditionally been a country of destination, especially for ECOWAS citizens<sup>9</sup>, and on the other, it has been a country of origin<sup>10</sup> (4% of the population lives outside the country, half of them in the EU) and transit for migrants travelling to other countries and continents<sup>11</sup>.

It is also important to highlight internal migration in Senegal, especially that caused by the abandonment of rural life and the displacement towards urban areas in the West. One of the main reasons for these displacements is the impact of climate change in rural areas, which are increasingly affected, and aggressive agricultural practices.

### 3. Relations and cooperation with the EU on migration and development aid

Defined as a 'bastion of democracy, migration priority for the EU'<sup>12</sup>, Senegal is a strategic partner for the EU's foreign action in areas such as security, migration, trade, fisheries, and development cooperation.

Senegal, as a country in the ACP group (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific<sup>13</sup>), coordinates its actions with the EU through the Cotonou Agreement (2000)<sup>14</sup> and the regional and bilateral negotiation agreements arising from it, known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)<sup>15</sup>. The Cotonou Agreement includes the 'issue of migration' as the subject of 'in-depth dialogue'. It establishes a prevention policy for illegal immigration and has a cooperation clause regarding the return of its nationals, leaving the door open to negotiations on the readmission of third country nationals and stateless persons. The European Development Fund (EDF) is the EU's main instrument for providing aid for development cooperation in the ACP States and overseas territories<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> In 2020, it ranked 168th out of 199 countries.

<sup>9</sup> There are 7.5 million migrants in the region, of which 70% stay in Africa and only 15% emigrate to Europe (ibid).

<sup>10</sup> The main countries of destination are France (134,848), Gambia (132,678), Italy (113,444), the United States (61,497) and Spain (59,549). IOM (2020). *World Migration report*, <https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/wmr-2020-interactive/?lang=ES>, accessed 4 October 2021.

<sup>11</sup> UNITED NATION POPULATION DIVISION, (2020) *International Migrants stock*, <https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock>

<sup>12</sup> BERNARDINI, (2018) *Senegal: bastion of democracy, migration priority for the EU* Directorate- General for External Policies [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO\\_IDA\(2018\)570490](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2018)570490)

<sup>13</sup> A group of 79 countries (48 African, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific) with which the EU has economic partnership agreements stemming from the Cotonou Agreement. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt are not part of the group.

<sup>14</sup> The objective of the Cotonou Agreement (2000) is to reduce poverty to eradicate it, support the sustainable economic, cultural and social development of partner countries, and facilitate the progressive integration of their respective economies into the world economy.

Issues related to migration are set forth in article 13.5. <https://bit.ly/33ps36S> The EU is currently negotiating the signing of a new framework agreement (Post-Cotonou). The current agreement, which was due to expire in March 2020, has been renewed. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (15/04/2021). Press Zone: Questions and Answers on the new EU/Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Partnership Agreement. <https://bit.ly/369dKnL> To learn more: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/policies/cotonou-agreement/>

<sup>15</sup> Pursuant to the Cotonou Agreement, EPA negotiations began with the various regions in 2002. The objective of these agreements is to promote the economic development of ACP countries through the progressive and asymmetrical opening of the market to trade in goods and services, and the improvement of cooperation in areas related to trade. They also try to establish a transparent and predictable framework that promotes investment in these countries. To this end, they include chapters on trade in goods and services, investment, intellectual property and public procurement, among other topics. The agreements are accompanied by financial measures channelled through the European Development Fund (EDF) to mitigate the impact of the structural adjustment of the countries.

<sup>16</sup> EUR-LEX (website). European Development Fund (EDF). <https://bit.ly/3uRyX06> For more information: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2002). The European Development Fund in a few words. <https://bit.ly/34X37nI>

Senegal maintains an open and active position in the political dialogue with the EU. It participates in different spaces such as the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME) and in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy with successive action plans that include political, economic and development dimensions; the creation of the three-party EU-African Union-United Nations unit<sup>17</sup>; and the establishment of action plans for security and development, such as the EU-Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020.

At the regional level, Senegal has participated in the Rabat process since 2006<sup>18</sup>, the aim of which is to strengthen political dialogue with the countries along the Western Mediterranean route. Under this framework, agreements and programmes are reinforced to promote the link between migration and development, the fight against irregular migration and related crimes and to bolster international protection.

Senegal is included in the 2015 EU-Africa Valletta Summit<sup>19</sup> de 2015 (from which a new funding instrument, the EUTF, arose to address migration management) and is underpinned as a priority country in the EU's Partnership Framework on migration with third countries<sup>20</sup>. Under this framework, a high-level commitment is established between Senegal and the EU regarding improvements in police border control, identification mechanisms and data collection from migrants, the start of a migration strategy at the national level, collaboration with FRONTEX, and the strengthening of voluntary return and readmission mechanisms.

In terms of development cooperation, the EU-Senegal relationship is part of a joint strategy programming between the two sides, initiated in 2014<sup>21</sup> and renewed in November 2018 until 2023, with support and funding from several European countries (including Spain)<sup>22</sup>. The joint strategy seeks to harmonise and synchronise the various bilateral programmes of the Member States present in the country with Senegal's own policies and the Plan for an Emerging Senegal<sup>23</sup>. The objectives of the joint strategy revolve around rural development, water and sanitation and the improvement of governance and include a crosscutting gender perspective.

EU financial support for development cooperation is channelled mainly through:

- a. The regional financial programme for West Africa of the EDF, under its Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)<sup>24</sup> to support countries in two ways: trade and development. These programmes

<sup>17</sup> With the aim of promoting the voluntary return of migrants from Libya and Niger.

<sup>18</sup> Senegal is part of a steering committee with five EU Member States (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain), five partner countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco and Senegal), as well as the European Commission and ECOWAS. The committee coordinates plans with 55 countries. Rabat Process website. <https://www.rabat-process.org/en/about>

<sup>19</sup> European Council (2015). *Cumbre de La Valeta sobre migración* <https://bit.ly/3sm7TTz>

<sup>20</sup> In this framework document, the concept of conditionality is explicitly described: 'A mix of positive and negative incentives will be integrated notably into the EU's development and trade policies to reward those countries willing to cooperate effectively with the EU on migration management and ensure there are consequences for those who do not cooperate'. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016). 'Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration', pg. 18, <https://bit.ly/3CqUKfL>

<sup>21</sup> Senegal - Joint programming - "Document conjoint de programmation" November 2014, <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/documents/senegal-joint-programming-document-conjoint-de-programmation-november-2014>

<sup>22</sup> Joint European Strategy Document 2018-2023, signed in 2018 by EU Head of Mission in Dakar, European donor countries and Senegalese Minister of Economy and Finance <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming-tracker/senegal>

<sup>23</sup> The Emerging Senegal Plan, drawn up by the Senegalese government, aims to coordinate the country's public policies and the development actors that collaborate with it through three major, long-term, strategic axes: the structural transformation of economic bases and growth; the promotion of human capital, social protection and sustainable development and good governance and the rule of law, peace and security. ICEX (2019). <https://bit.ly/3dli97m>

<sup>24</sup> Economic Partnership Agreement between the West African States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), on the one hand, and the European Union and its Member States, on the other. Brussels, 3 December 2014. <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13370-2014-INIT/es/pdf>

are considered development assistance as it is understood that trade agreements can reduce poverty and improve living conditions by improving economic relations and establishing a free trade zone. As mentioned above, this funding is set out in the Cotonou Agreement, which includes a readmission clause for nationals in an irregular situation. Senegal received €340 million in support from the European Development Fund (EDF 2008-2013). The following edition, the XI EDF (2014-2020) set a budget of €347 million for Senegal.

b. The EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)<sup>25</sup>.

Senegal benefits from 10 national, seven regional and four cross-sectoral projects under the EUTF.

**Table 1. EUTF FUNDS IN PROJECTS WITH SENEGAL**

LEVEL	NO. OF PROJECTS	EUTF FUNDS
NATIONAL	10	€ 170.911.934
REGIONAL	7	€ 257.400.000
INTERSECTORAL	4	€ 152.891.266

Source: European Commission<sup>26</sup> Own creation.

A detailed reading of the EUTF national projects in Senegal<sup>27</sup> (see Annex I) reveals the emphasis given to proposals related to the management and containment of migration, with the aim of reducing migration, promoting voluntary return and controlling flows with security systems. These projects are allocated 92% of the funds, compared to the 8% allocated to actions related to addressing the root causes of mobility, thus prioritising migration control and pushing economic development objectives to the background<sup>28</sup>.

For Senegal, accepting the premises of the EU and its Member States has so far been very convenient, since it represents political support and financial backing: European investments in Senegal represented 20% of the GDP and created 70,000 jobs in 2018<sup>29</sup>. In turn, the ODA funds received represent 5.7% of the Gross National Income (on average between 2005 2019)<sup>30</sup>, a figure equivalent to 54% of the country's public investment budget in recent years<sup>31</sup>. The EU's contribution to development and external action between 2014 and 2020 was €347 million, in addition to €400 million that has been allocated since 2014 through different instruments and thematic lines (including the EUTF)<sup>32</sup>.

Several of the African civil society organisations interviewed for this investigation were critical of European action in Senegal: they believe that European interests take precedence over the needs of

<sup>25</sup> The official name of which is the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa). For more information: European Commission (Webpage), EUTF [https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en)

<sup>26</sup> EUTF- Senegal (2021) [https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/senegal\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/senegal_en), accessed 05/05/2021

<sup>27</sup> Activities related to migration management appear in several projects encompassed by the EUTF in various sectors such as job creation or the improvement of governance and conflict prevention. Thus, migration management is addressed in sectors other than those that the EUTF specifically calls such. See Annex 1: List of EUTF projects in Senegal.

<sup>28</sup> Critical analysis of the EUTF can be found in: Oxfam (2020). "The EU Trust Fund for Africa Trapped between aid policy and migration politics", <https://bit.ly/3GPAVBw> o CONCORD (2018) "¿Asociación o condicionalidad?" <https://bit.ly/3luUHTA>

<sup>29</sup> ICEX. News Senegal (May 2019). "Las inversiones europeas en Senegal representan el 20 % del PIB y la creación de 70 000 empleos" <https://bit.ly/3BBLowD>

<sup>30</sup> WORLD BANK (2021). Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received (% del GNI), <https://bit.ly/2ZKcB38>, accessed 30/06/2021

<sup>31</sup> From 2015 to 2018 according to data from the African Development Bank Group (2021), "Senegal - Country Strategy Paper 2021-2025" <https://bit.ly/3G1kzuy> France is the main donor. Spain is among the country's top 15 donors, along with the rest of the OECD countries and Kuwait. AIDFLOWS (2021) "Country data Senegal" <https://bit.ly/3EtYbmu>

<sup>32</sup> BERNARDINI, (2018) "Senegal: bastion of democracy, migration priority for the EU" Directorate- General for External Policies <https://bit.ly/3msr10Ff>

Senegalese society<sup>33</sup>. This was especially the case regarding the EUTF: doubts<sup>34</sup> about its effectiveness, programming and design were raised even by the European Court of Auditors<sup>35</sup>.

## 4. Relations and cooperation with Spain on migration and development aid

Senegal is one of the priority countries for Spain in Africa in terms of foreign action and development cooperation. Proof of this is how it is treated in the three Africa Plans and the five development cooperation plans approved to date.

As relations have evolved between the two countries, objectives related to security and economic and trade interests (with special focus on the fishing and energy sectors) have gained more relevance over time as compared to those related to the fight against poverty and inequality<sup>36</sup>.

As a result of the 'Cayucos crisis' in 2006, institutional visits multiplied and diplomatic deployment intensified until 2012, reinforcing relations between the two countries. In this sense, new measures were adopted in the field of development cooperation and cooperation in migration matters<sup>37</sup> and a management model to be followed by the EU was consolidated<sup>38</sup>.

The partnership relationship between the two countries has been strengthened with numerous bilateral agreements, treaties, joint declarations, and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs)<sup>39</sup> signed since then, covering all areas, including development cooperation and migration:

33 In addition to these two funds related to development aid (EUTF and EDF), there are other types of agreements that include financial compensation in exchange for the exploitation of specific resources and which can play an important role in maintaining ties or making demands. In this sense, the sustainable fisheries partnership agreements between the EU and Senegal stand out, as they establish an annual financial compensation in exchange for access to Senegalese fishery resources in support of the fishing sector. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Fisheries Partnership Agreement. [https://ec.europa.eu/oceans-and-fisheries/fisheries/international-agreements/sustainable-fisheries-partnership-agreements-sfpas\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/oceans-and-fisheries/fisheries/international-agreements/sustainable-fisheries-partnership-agreements-sfpas_en)

34 More information at: OXFAM (2017). An emergency for whom? <https://bit.ly/3H24Czd>

35 European Court of Auditors (2018). 'Special report no 32/2018: European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Flexible but lacking focus'. <https://bit.ly/3woDcim>

36 Which, according to the Group of African Studies, means leaving out 'the human rights, gender and environmental approaches'; GEA (2020). Op. Cit.

37 The possibility of increasing the political projection and institutional presence of Spain in the region was also evaluated. Spain believed that improved relations would make it possible to adequately regulate migration flows and promote sustainable development and the fight against poverty. In this period, there was a sharp drop in arrivals to the Canary Islands: from 31,678 arrivals in 2006, to only 190 in 2010.

38 Elements of control plus reward compensation can be considered the aspects that make up the 'Spanish model' of border externalisation in African countries GABRIELLI L., (2017): "La externalización europea del control migratorio ¿La acción española como modelo?" <https://bit.ly/3bKJ9N2>

39 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) are informal instruments for establishing agreements and represent an essential foreign policy instrument due to their flexibility and lack of oversight. They deal with all sorts of matters such as education, trade, economic matters, security issues, maritime control, repatriations or returns, and many of them are not public. They are established in Law 25/2014, of 27 November, on Treaties and other International Agreements, which mentions them under the name of 'non-regulatory international agreements', defined as 'international agreements that do not constitute a treaty nor an international administrative agreement between the State, Government, bodies, agencies and entities of the General State Administration, [...] and any other subject of public law with the competence to enter such an agreement, and which contain declarations of intent or establish political, technical or logistical action commitments, and do not constitute a source of international obligations nor are they governed by International Law.'

For more information: MARTÍN, J. (2015). *La ley de tratados y otros acuerdos internacionales: Una nueva regulación para disciplinar una práctica internacional difícil de ignorar* – Revista REDI <http://www.revista-redi.es/es/articulos/la-ley-de-tratados-y-otros-acuerdos-internacionales-una-nueva-regulacion-para-disciplinar-una-practica-internacional-dificil-de-ignorar/>

**Table 2. MAIN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SPAIN AND SENEGAL**

24 August 2006	Memorandum of Understanding between Spain and Senegal to fight against illegal immigration <sup>40</sup>
19 October 2006	Bilateral Cooperation Framework Agreement, signed in Dakar.
5 December 2006	Cooperation Agreement to Fight Crime, signed in Dakar by both Ministers of Justice.
5 December 2006	Bilateral Cooperation Agreement on the Framework for the Prevention of Migration of Unaccompanied Senegalese Minors, their Protection, Repatriation and Reinsertion, signed in Dakar <sup>41</sup>
5 December 2006	Joint Declaration on the management of legal migration flows, signed in Dakar <sup>42</sup>
18 March 2009	Minutes I Spanish-Senegalese Joint Commission for Development Cooperation 2009-2012
3 November 2009	Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate-General of the Police and the Civil Guard of Spain and the National Gendarmerie of Senegal, signed in Dakar.
2 December 2013	Country Partnership Framework (CPF)
19 January 2015	Cooperation protocol between the CITCO (Centre of Intelligence against Terrorism and Organised Crime) and the ADRN (General Delegation of National Intelligence)
1 July 2016	Joint statement by Senegal and Spain on the actions of the European agency FRONTEX.
20 July 2017	Joint declaration under the framework of Spanish-Senegalese cooperation in the fight against irregular migration <sup>43</sup> .
16 September 2020	Text of the III Joint Cooperation Committee and Country Partnership Framework (CPF) 2019-2023 <sup>44</sup> .
8 and 9 April 2021	Joint Declaration on the Occasion of the Official Visit to the Republic of Senegal of His Excellency Pedro Sánchez, President of the Government of Spain, Dakar <sup>45</sup>
9 April 2021	MoU between the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration of the Kingdom of Spain and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad of the Republic of Senegal in the field of migration management and governance.
9 April 2021	MoU between the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration of the Kingdom of Spain and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad of the Republic of Senegal on orderly and regular safe movements.
Own creation based on: Country file MAUC (2021), Moncloa (2021), González J. (2015) <sup>37</sup> , Cabrera M. (2008)	

The close relationship continues to this day, as reflected in the current Africa Plan.

#### 4.1. Senegal in the Africa Plans

The first Africa Plan was launched in 2006, redefining Spanish foreign policy in the region<sup>46</sup>. Migration control is the main focus of these plans, next to trade and economic interests.

40 This memorandum sets the guidelines for police cooperation on migration control between the two countries, including joint patrols, the expansion of Frontex operations to Senegalese waters, the training of Senegalese personnel and the presence of Spanish liaison officers in Senegal. It is not published in the BOE. Its content has been made known through unofficial means (press and investigations) through what can be considered a selective and calculated filtering of the information that is made public. GONZÁLEZ, J. -CIDOB (2015) *El control de la inmigración irregular en España: compromisos y desarrollos* <https://bit.ly/3koz90M>

For more information see the academic study: CABRERA (2008). "Los acuerdos bilaterales suscritos por España en materia migratoria con países del continente africano: especial consideración de la readmisión de inmigrantes en situación irregular" <https://bit.ly/3C5xR06>

The content of this agreement was requested through the Transparency Portal but it was not provided to us.

41 It is resumed in the Protocol of Application of the Agreement between Spain and Senegal on Cooperation in the Field of Prevention of the Migration of Unaccompanied Senegalese Minors, their Protection, Repatriation and Reinsertion, signed on 23 February 2009 by the Minister of Labour and Immigration and the Senegalese Minister of Justice.

42 Not published but was obtained after requesting it from the Transparency portal for this investigation.

43 Spain and Senegal agree to intensify bilateral cooperation to fight terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking, and strengthen management of migration flows. <https://bit.ly/3BpgFVe>

44 Continuation of Spain's commitment to Senegal for Development Cooperation. The work against irregular migration and associated crime is included. [https://www.cooperacionespanola.es/sites/default/files/map\\_senegal.pdf](https://www.cooperacionespanola.es/sites/default/files/map_senegal.pdf)

45 In which the presidents of the governments of Spain and Senegal confirmed their commitment to cooperating in the fight against irregular immigration and collaborating to promote the development of the country (agriculture, waste management, trade reinforcement, universal access to vaccinations, etc.). MONCLOA (2021) *Declaración conjunta de los presidentes Pedro Sánchez y Macky Sall* <https://bit.ly/2ZPNLPD>

46 According to Olivé and Oya (2009), the Africa Plans are some of the few plans prepared by the Spanish administration that include a strategic vision of Spanish foreign action, contemplating all types of sectors, from development cooperation to defence policy. However, according to the authors, if we consider the potential of the instrument, the distribution (sectoral and geographical) of the foreign action included is a limit to its possibility of success.

See OLIVÉ, I., and OYA, C. (2009) *Desarrollo, coherencia y concentración: algunos comentarios al Plan África 2009-2012*. Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI), n.o 94: 1. <https://bit.ly/3oLFwxx>

In addition to increasing opportunities and the internationalisation of Spanish export companies, the first Africa Plan (2006/2008)<sup>47</sup> sought to consolidate the partnership with Africa in terms of migration control (developing internal, bilateral and multilateral lines of action). Senegal is listed as a country of priority interest. The Plan reflects decisive reasons for cooperation with Senegal 'linked to the necessary regulation of migration flows'<sup>48</sup>, as well as its relevance in terms of security in the triangle formed by 'Cape Verde, Mauritania and Senegal, as an extension of the Canary Islands axis, representing an area increasingly used for drug trafficking networks, illegal human trafficking and organised crime'<sup>49</sup>.

The Second Africa Plan<sup>50</sup> (2009-2012) delved further into the line developed by the first plan, with Senegal being a country to which all the objectives of the Plan apply<sup>51</sup>, emphasising that it has become a privileged destination for Spanish ODA as well as an important trade and fishing partner. The prioritisation of development cooperation in Senegal is linked to the need to regulate migration flows.

The first two plans mainly responded to Spain's interests in Africa, treating the continent as an object and not as an active subject<sup>52</sup>. In both plans, migration management is included among other development actions.

In 2018, Spain became the main entry route by sea to Europe, with more than 57,000 migrants arriving on its shores. Given the situation, this instrument was taken up again, and the Third Africa Plan was approved<sup>53</sup> in 2019 (currently still in force). Its objectives include promoting sustainable development, promoting peace and security, strengthening institutions, and supporting orderly, regular and safe mobility<sup>54</sup>. Senegal remains a priority country in this plan.

The action programme of the Third Africa Plan, known as 'Focus Africa 2023'<sup>55</sup> attempts to resolve the criticism voiced about the plan's lack of specificity and narrow down its objectives, categorising them into seven priorities and specifying actions to be developed in the countries. In this plan, Senegal, along with Morocco, is a pilot country for foreign action, which implies that Spain will implement new coordination measures and joint working methods between the various departments of the AGE and will develop experiences that can later be replicated in other African countries. There has been considerable deployment of Africa Focus projects and programmes in Senegal<sup>56</sup>, with interventions in the economic sector, development cooperation and migration cooperation (in addition to peace and security in regional programmes).

## 4.2. Evolution of Official Development Assistance from Spain in Senegal

Spain has ranked among the top 10 ODA donors to Senegal for years<sup>57</sup>. Since 2004, the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) has had a technical cooperation office based in Dakar.

47 MAEC (2006). Africa Plan 2006-2008. <http://crea-africa.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/LIBROPLANAFRICA.pdf>

48 Africa Plan 2006-2008. (Ibid) Pgs. 43 and 44

49 Ibid. Pg 52

50 MAEC. (2009) *Plan África 2009-2012* <https://bit.ly/33lhNwf>

51 It includes these objectives: 1. Support for the processes of consolidation of Democracy and construction of peace and security in Africa. 2. Contribute to the fight against poverty in Africa. 3. Promote trade and investment relations between Spain and Africa, and African economic development. 4. Consolidation of the partnership with Africa on migration. 5. Reinforce the Spain-Africa relationship through multilateral channels and the European Union. 6. Consolidate Spain's political and institutional presence in Africa. See Second Africa Plan (Ibid.)

52 AZKONA, N. (2013) *La coherencia de los Planes África a examen: La relación entre los flujos de migración y los fondos de cooperación al desarrollo entre África Occidental y la Unión Europea* [Tesis doctoral, UPV-EHU]. Universidad del País Vasco. [toc0000005233001.pdf](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-84-9732-300-1)

53 MAUC, (2021) *III Plan África: España y África Desafío y oportunidad*, <https://bit.ly/3GdQzpo>

54 Although it mentions the positive impact of African mobility, the Plan focuses excessively on population growth and human mobility. According to the Group of African Studies, it offers a rather negative perception of the phenomena of African population growth and mobility, portraying them as 'threats' and emphasising the risks or 'challenges' they pose. Furthermore, it does not use the policy coherence for development approach (PCD) or align its actions with other government commitments in development matters, such as the SDGs, the 2030 Agenda or the Global Migration Compact. Grupo de Estudios Africanos-GEA (2020). *¿Más allá del "interés nacional" y la seguridad?: propuestas para otra política exterior española en África. Algunas reflexiones críticas desde el grupo de estudios africanos al III Plan África* <https://bit.ly/3jXuaUC>

55 MAUC (2021) *Foco África 2023* <https://bit.ly/3lh9zFa>

56 For more information, see the Focus Africa document in Annex 1, on actions scheduled for 2020-2023 <https://bit.ly/3lh9zFa>

57 AIDFLOWS - OECD. (Database). Country profiles, [www.aidflows.org](http://www.aidflows.org) accessed 18/7/2021

The framework for Spanish development cooperation with Senegal is specifically established in the Cooperation Framework Agreement of 2006, which establishes a close relationship of joint, bilateral work. On the other hand, the priority relationship in terms of development cooperation is reflected in the master plans and the signing of the country partnership frameworks<sup>58</sup> that include a budgetary commitment<sup>59</sup> to continue supporting the Emerging Senegal Plan<sup>60</sup>.

**Table 3. PRIORITY LEVEL OF SENEGAL IN EACH MASTER PLAN AND ANNUAL ODA DISBURSEMENTS**

Priority in each Master Plan	Year	Net aid disbursed (bilateral only) €	Net aid disbursed (bi and multilateral) €	Gross aid disbursed (bi and multilateral) €
First Master Plan: High priority country	2002	7,699,536	7,699,536	8,034,130
	2003	30,730,488	30,730,488	31,594,497
	2004	14,750,583	14,795,396	15,110,231
Second Master Plan: Priority Country	2005	66,269,833	66,763,829	67,297,656
	2006	14,436,937	14,436,937	15,095,173
	2007	20,229,536	30,438,049	30,730,689
	2008	35,230,673	40,990,946	40,990,946
Third Master Plan: Group A: Comprehensive Partnership Country	2009	38,831,261	41,734,990	41,734,990
	2010	33,085,426	34,404,243	34,404,243
	2011	24,920,309	26,494,337	26,494,337
	2012	10,230,718	10,230,718	10,230,718
Fourth Master Plan: Partnership country	2013	14,713,010	14,713,010	15,361,875
	2014	7,920,825	8,856,825	9,468,234
	2015	11,707,839	12,207,839	12,498,763
	2016	6,901,548	6,901,548	10,420,060
	2017	8,327,726	8,452,726	13,981,049
Fourth master plan: Partnership country <sup>61</sup>	2018*	14,130,042	14,730,042	14,730,042
	2019*	16,096,140	16,344,160	16,344,160

Own creation based on various sources: Oxfam Intermón, the Info@OD Official Development Assistance IT System of the MAEC and Spanish Cooperation Master Plans.

Regarding how funds are channelled to execute programmes, Spanish development cooperation in Senegal is mainly bilateral. Spain is also a key player in cooperation delegated by the EU.

<sup>58</sup> The Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs) are strategic planning instruments for development cooperation aimed at bringing shared visions, work and focuses into harmony with the partner country. In September 2019, the new Country Partnership Framework 2019-2023 with Senegal was signed. [https://www.xn--cooperacionspaola-10b.es/sites/default/files/map\\_senegal\\_4.pdf](https://www.xn--cooperacionspaola-10b.es/sites/default/files/map_senegal_4.pdf)

<sup>59</sup> For the 2009-2012 period, a disbursement of €65 million was expected, although in the end it exceeded €102 million according to MAEC data available at [www.info@od.es](http://www.info@od.es) For the 2019-2023 period, the commitment is €128 million.

On 18 March 2009, the first Spain-Senegal Joint Cooperation Commission (ICOMIX) was signed (2009-2012). [https://www.aecid-senegal.sn/?wpfb\\_dl=423](https://www.aecid-senegal.sn/?wpfb_dl=423)


<sup>60</sup> The Emerging Senegal Plan promoted by the Government of Senegal includes three major long-term strategic axes: the structural transformation of the economic bases and economic growth; the promotion of human capital, social protection and sustainable development and good governance and the rule of law, peace and security. These axes mark the coordination of the country's public policies and the development actors that collaborate with it. For this second phase, Senegal has made new commitments for an amount of \$14 billion from the international community. ICEX information (2019). <https://bit.ly/3dli97m>.

<sup>61</sup> \*As of 2018, a new model for measuring funds equivalent to ODA grants (TOSSD) came into use. It does not allow comparison with the previous net and gross ODA flows since it includes other official flows to developing countries that are not technically considered ODA because they do not meet the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria.

## a. Bilateral cooperation

Bilateral channelling of ODA<sup>62</sup> in Senegal is considerable.

**GRAPH 1.- Net bilateral ODA in Senegal**



Own creation based on INFO@OD and MAUC DATA.<sup>63</sup>

Between 2005 and 2009, there were particularly relevant debt forgiveness and debt conversion transactions approved by the government during negotiations with Senegal (2005-2008) to strengthen migration control for a value of €67,795,747<sup>64</sup>. During this period, Spanish development cooperation was committed to its presence in the region and the leading role of the MAEC and the AECID was established.

The financial crisis has led to a steep drop in development cooperation since 2011<sup>65</sup>. As a result, the average net ODA funds allocated to Senegal went from €34.8 million per year from 2007 to 2011 to €10.2 million from 2012 to 2017.

As of 2018<sup>66</sup>, the total figures are higher compared to previous years. However, it is not possible to adequately compare with the previous data since it is collected with a new measurement system established by the DAC<sup>67</sup> that includes concepts previously not recognised as AOD<sup>68</sup>.

<sup>62</sup> Bilateral aid is a channelling method by which the donor country provides official development assistance to the partner country to carry out specific actions. These actions are most often executed directly by a public entity of the beneficiary country (partner government or other local actors), a public entity of the donor country (the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation [AECID], in the case of Spain), or indirectly through a Development NGO or other private entity that works in the country of destination. Oxfam Intermón (s/f). The Reality of Aid. Glossary. <http://www.realidadayuda.org/glossary>

<sup>63</sup> All the information presented was extracted from the Info@OD Official Development Assistance Information System of the © Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation. <https://infood.maec.es/> The data refers to bilateral aid, or that between the two states, and does not include the funds that Spain channels through international organisations, which is of little significance in the case of Senegal.

<sup>64</sup> In 2005, there were two cancellations of debt amounting to €53,912,899.89, another cancellation in 2006 of €84,727.03. The debt conversion operations were approved in 2007 (€62,216.24) and 2008 (€13,735,904.52).

<sup>65</sup> In those years there were cuts in ODA, falling below 0.2% of the GDP, far from the 0.7% claimed by specialised civil society organisations.

<sup>66</sup> At the closing date of this report, the data for 2020 and 2021 were not available on the MAEC website.

<sup>67</sup> The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the body of the ODA donor countries that are members of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). The OECD is an international body created in 1961 and made up of 34 so-called 'economically developed' countries.

<sup>68</sup> The Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD). See: MAUC (2021). *Metodología de seguimiento de AOD y otros flujos oficiales al desarrollo sostenible (TOSSD)* <https://bit.ly/3GN7RJRD>

The MAEC-MAUC is the main cooperation actor in Senegal in economic terms (managing 57% of the net ODA allocated since 2005), although there is a great diversity of actors, including institutions that focus to a greater extent on migration issues, such as the Ministries of the Interior, Defence, Labour and Migration. As far as the Ministry of the Interior is concerned, it should be noted that the disbursements of ODA are reflected in police cooperation activities with the country as early as 2005 and are maintained over the following years, accounting for 3% of the total net ODA in the 2005-2009 period, 10% in 2010-2015 and 4% in 2016-2019<sup>69</sup>.

Without considering these police cooperation activities (the content of which we were not able to obtain specific information about)<sup>70</sup>, in general, the projects financed with Spanish bilateral ODA in Senegal related to migration or refuge do not represent a proportionally significant amount (less than 1% of the total ODA<sup>71</sup>), although the coincidence between the increase in funds and periods of greater migration flow on the Atlantic route is significant.

## b. Delegated Cooperation with the UE.

In issues of migration, beyond Spanish bilateral ODA, the projects managed under the delegated cooperation channel, that is, by Spanish institutions with EU funds, among others, are significant. In Spain, delegated cooperation is managed through the AECID and FIIAPP.

### - AECID

Since 2016, AECID manages three delegated cooperation projects in Senegal with funds from the EUTF for a total of €27,500.00 and two regional projects with funds from the EDF and ENI. The sum of these funds is close to the total Spanish ODA channelled by AECID to Senegal in this period (€55,199,107).

Several of these projects are related to migration: on the one hand, from the perspective of limiting migration through job creation and improving access to services; on the other hand, with a focus on promoting financial mechanisms for remittances from the foreign diaspora. In addition, these projects also put the focus on returnees in collaboration with IOM<sup>72</sup>.

<sup>69</sup> On the other hand, in some years, despite there being items under the concept of 'police cooperation' listed in info@oda, they do not have an assigned monetary amount, which means that in the end they were not accounted for as ODA because they did not meet the criteria. When they do not meet the criteria, they are considered Other Official Flows (OOF): or transactions that take place between a donor country and a partner country included in the DAC's list of recipients that do not meet any of the eligibility requirements to be accounted for as ODA. (This may happen because their primary purpose is not development or, in the case of loans, they do not reach the required threshold of concessionality.) Oxfam Intermón (Website). The Reality of Aid. Glossary. AOTDS/TOSSD. <https://bit.ly/3LwUr8e> In this regard, it is worth noting that €29,777,976 in OOF funds was allocated by the Ministry of the Interior from 2016 to 2019 to police and surveillance cooperation projects, maritime rescue and the fight against irregular immigration and human trafficking in Mauritania and Senegal.

<sup>70</sup> The figures and content of the cooperation projects managed by the Ministry of the Interior in Senegal (as well as Algeria and Mauritania) were requested through the Spanish Government's transparency portal. We received a partial response, including only the name of some of the budget subheadings to which this aid belonged and the annual figure of some of them. In some cases, there was no indication of the specific amounts for each country but the total sum for both Mauritania and Senegal. Nor did the response clarify whether these subheadings were the only ones disbursed or there are also disbursements under other headings or subheadings. The Ministry justified its incomplete response on the basis that giving more information would exceed the limits of its duty of transparency since 'under the framework of this aid, actions related to national and public security are covered, as well as international relations developed by the Kingdom of Spain'.

<sup>71</sup> From 2005 to 2019.

<sup>72</sup> The IOM works to accompany the government of Senegal in the appropriation of this type of initiative. Interview with IOM Senegal, October 14, 2021. More information on IOM's voluntary return programme at EU-IOM Joint Initiative <https://bit.ly/3plxHir>

**Table 4. CURRENT AECID DELEGATED COOPERATION PROJECTS AND ORIGIN OF FUNDS**

Title	Funds	Managed by AECID	Implementer	Participating organisations
Improving the Response of Vulnerable Communities to Nutritional and Food Crises and Access to Basic Services (YELLITAARE)	€ 8.000.000 (EUTF)	€ 8.000.000 (AECID contributes € 1.000.000)	AECID	AECID, Fighting Malnutrition Unit (CLM) of the Senegalese Government, Decentralized services of the State and Regional Collectives
Strengthening the Management and Governance of Migration, Return and Sustainable Reintegration, and Accompanying the Investments of the Senegalese Diaspora	€ 27.900.000 (EUTF)	€ 10.000.000	AECID, IOM French Development Agency	AECID, Directorate-General for Senegalese Abroad of the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Development Agencies and Ministry of Economy and Public Finance - Human Resources Directorate
Support for the Reduction of Migration through the Creation of Jobs in the Rural Area, through the implementation of Collective and Individual Farms (Natanguées Farms) in Regions of High Migration Potential (PACERSEN)	€ 20.000.000 (EUTF)	€ 9.500.000	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Italy) and AECID	AECID, National Agency for Agricultural Insertion and Development of the Ministry of Agriculture of Rural Equipment, Decentralized services of the State and local communities
RECIDE Resilient Cities Development - Covenant of Mayors for sustainable urban development and management	€ 30.000.000 (FED y IEV)	€ 6.684.000	AECID, IOM French Development Agency, GIZ Germany	World Bank Consortium with several cities in Senegal, Mauritania, Cape Verde and Mozambique
Financial Inclusion Programme Through the Diaspora - INCLUSIFI	€ 20.000.000 (FED y IEV)	€ 11.440.000	AECID, COFIDES	Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) and the United Nations Agency IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development)
Own creation based on AECID Delegated Cooperation Report (2018) <sup>73</sup> and EUTF WEBSITE <sup>74</sup>				

On the other hand, as indicated in the 2019-2023 CPF, FIIAPP is a key player in Spanish development cooperation in Senegal. Less well-known than AECID, FIIAPP's foundational goal is to improve the institutional framework and the functioning of the public systems in the countries where it works. The Foundation is fundamentally dedicated to carrying out public technical cooperation with third countries; coordinating its priorities with those of the EU and those of the public administrations and ministries of Spain<sup>75</sup>.

## - FIIAPP

The projects that include Senegal either at the regional (see Annex II) or national level add up to €99,832,915<sup>76</sup> (18% of the Foundation's total funds for 2005-2020)<sup>77</sup>.

<sup>73</sup> AECID (2018) *Informe AECID Cooperación Delegada* <https://bit.ly/3gkYxC1>

<sup>74</sup> EUTF <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/partner/spanish-agency-international-development-cooperation>; accessed 31/05/2021

<sup>75</sup> Interview with FIIAPP, 22 September 2021.

<sup>76</sup> According to data from the Foundation's website, <https://www.fiiapp.org/>, accessed 15 October 2021

<sup>77</sup> 99% of these funds come from the European Commission. In terms of sectors, most of the actions are related to security and the fight against organised crime (84%), followed by migration and mobility (12%).

To analyse the projects and financing of FIIAPP in Senegal, we reviewed the foundation's website and annual reports from 2005 to 2020.

**Table 5.- FIIAPP NATIONAL PROJECTS IN SENEGAL<sup>77</sup>**

Project Title	Sponsor	Budget	Collaborators	Sector
Protection of the rights of minors in Senegal	EUROPEAN COMMISSION	€ 1.516.715	Ministry of Labour	Migration and mobility
SENSEC-EU for internal security in Senegal	EUTF	€ 2.585.700,00	Led by CIVIPOL with the Ministry of the Interior; IOM	Security and fight against organised crime
Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in Senegal-POC	EUTF	€ 9.000.000,00	Ministry of the Interior, National Police	Security and fight against organised crime
Assistance on migration in Senegal	AECID	€ 532.000	Ministry of the Interior	Migration and mobility
Humanitarian demining course	AECID	€ 84.400,00	Spanish Army/Academy of Engineers of Hoyo del Manzanares	Security and fight against organised crime
Justice and Technical Assistance for the Directorate-General for Minors Identification Programme of the Senegalese Ministry of Justice	AECID	€ 40.000	FIAPP	Migration and mobility

Own creation based on and FIAPP annual reports and website.

The national projects developed by FIIAPP in Senegal are mostly in the security sector and the fight against organised crime, following the line of cooperation established by the EU and the EUTF. The role of the Ministry of the Interior and the Security Forces and Corps as collaborators of the FIIAPP in its projects is very important. They develop training and technical assistance actions for the Senegalese authorities in internal security services, the fight against human trafficking and smuggling, border control, etc. On the other hand, interventions related to addressing the causes of poverty or supporting the refugee or displaced population are minor (there is only one project to improve the employment of boys and girls). No interventions related to international protection for the internally displaced population, asylum seekers or refugees were identified.

On the other hand, the Foundation has specialised in regional projects that do multi-country work in which several states collaborate and exchange knowledge<sup>79</sup>. Senegal is included in numerous multi-country and/or regional projects deployed by the Foundation. Of these, 95% of the funds come from the European Commission, dealing fundamentally with two sectors: mobility and migration, and security and the fight against organised crime.

As for migration and mobility, the FIIAPP developed four regional projects between 2010 and 2015 with EU funding for a total of € 9,618,843<sup>80</sup>. Prior to the existence of the EUTF, these projects consisted of supporting dialogue processes and partnerships between countries for migration management, including the Rabat Action Plan<sup>81</sup> and the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment<sup>82</sup>.

Regarding the 'Security and fight against organised crime' sector, FIIAPP<sup>83</sup> manage projects worth €84,130,763 in collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior and the Civil Guard, for the most part. The GAR-SI SAHEL

<sup>78</sup> Except for the humanitarian demining course, all the projects have some component related to migration and/or border control.

<sup>79</sup> FIIAPP began working on migration in 2006 following the 'Cayucos crisis' with a programme on Migration and Development. The programme focused on institutional strengthening, support for political processes, knowledge generation and management.

<sup>80</sup> In migration and mobility there is another project funded by AECID for €177,429: Institutional Strengthening of the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) and its Member States in Migration and Development.

<sup>81</sup> Rabat Process: a dialogue on migration and development between almost 60 African and European countries in which migration policies between these countries are created. More information: <https://www.processusderabat.net/>

<sup>82</sup> The Africa-EU Strategy, which began in 2007, is the working channel for the EU and Africa. Migration, Mobility and Employment is one of the strategic areas. <https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/partnership-and-joint-africa-eu-strategy>

<sup>83</sup> Category also known as Security, Peace and Development.

project financed through the EUTF with a budget of €66,600,000 is especially noteworthy in terms of funds received.

### **GAR-SI SAHEL (Rapid action groups for monitoring and intervention in the Sahel)**

Led by FIAPP and the Civil Guard in consortium with France, Italy and Portugal, the project was developed from 2016 to 2020 in the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad) as well as Senegal. A total amount of €66,600,000 was allocated to it. It is an ambitious project that, under the security and development bundle, seeks stability in the region by reinforcing the capabilities of the security forces and improving cross-border cooperation. It focuses on the training and equipping of police units (the GAR-SI) by EU security forces to boost their capacity against terrorism, organised crime, irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling and to ensure effective control of the territory.

The project involves a strong deployment of security forces and border controls in the region, prioritising security within that alleged binomial 'security/development'.

## **5. Migration, border management and conditionality**

### **5.1. Senegal as a country of origin: migration and refuge**

The migration phenomenon in Senegal is intense and diverse: internally there is a lot of mobility of people between regions, especially from rural areas to cities, (mainly to Dakar)<sup>84</sup>. There is also significant international migration. In fact, the balance is negative: more people emigrate from Senegal than arrive<sup>85</sup> (not counting the difficulties in measuring irregular migration). The countries of destination are diverse, most of them in West Africa, but also Europe<sup>86</sup> and South America.

According to UNHCR data<sup>87</sup>, in mid-2021 there were 14,364 Senegalese refugees in the world<sup>88</sup> in addition to 17,155 asylum seekers<sup>89</sup>.

Regarding Spain, there has been a considerable increase in asylum applications from Senegalese: from the 32 received in 2010, to 937 in 2019, 1,080 applications in 2020<sup>90</sup> and 3,198 in 2021<sup>91</sup>. International protection is granted at a very low rate since, according to data from the Ministry of the Interior. Only 12 applicants were granted refugee status and there were hardly three favourable resolutions for subsidiary protection in 2021<sup>92</sup>.

84 Migrants from other regions represent a quarter of the population of Dakar. ASND and IOM (2019) *Migration au Senegal: Profile Migratoire* <https://bit.ly/3pQnk6W>

85 Ibid.

86 The Senegalese population residing in Spain constitutes the second largest group of immigrants from Africa (after Morocco), with 60,412 migrants with residence permits (34% women). This represents 1.47% of all 5,434,153 foreigners registered in Spain and 0.17% of the total population in Spain.

INE (2020) Op.cit. and OBSERVATORIO PERMANENTE DE INMIGRACIÓN, (2020) 'Estadística de residentes Extranjeros en España' <https://bit.ly/3nFjXND>

All these figures refer to Senegalese people with valid residence permits: it is extremely complicated to estimate a figure for the number of migrants in an irregular situation who may reside in Spain. However, the Gálvez-Iniesta study estimates around 7,730 Senegalese in 2019. GÁLVEZ-INIESTA (2020). 'The size, socio-economic composition and fiscal implications of the irregular immigration in Spain' Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. <https://bit.ly/3E0Dd1S>

87 UNHCR. Refugee Data Base. <https://bit.ly/3Lz1Pjq>

88 The majority in Italy, Gambia, France and Guinea-Bissau.

89 These requests were made mainly in Brazil, Spain, Argentina and France.

90 UNHCR (2021) Ibid

91 MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (2021). *Avance de solicitudes y propuestas de resolución de protección internacional. Datos provisionales acumulados entre el 1 de enero y el 31 de diciembre de 2021*, <https://bit.ly/3ggYLM>

92 Compared to the 1,342 unfavourable resolutions.

M. INTERIOR, (2022) *Información Estadística* <https://bit.ly/3BkIP3m> Accessed 28/01/2022

Under the slogan 'Barça walla barzakh'<sup>93</sup>, the Senegalese population sees irregular migration as their only option. In general, the migration profile of Senegal is mostly made up of young men with few professional opportunities<sup>94</sup>. Women migrate as students or for family reunification. There is a trend of more and more women deciding to migrate alone<sup>95</sup>, with women and girls being the main victims of human trafficking for sexual and/or labour exploitation in Senegal.

The desire or need to migrate together with the lack of regular ways to do so facilitates international and local criminal networks and results in the loss of many lives to dangerous journeys both at sea and in the desert<sup>96</sup>.

### Human trafficking and smuggling in Senegal

With regard to criminal networks for human trafficking and smuggling, it has been demonstrated that they grow exponentially richer the more difficult the routes are. In Senegal, human smuggling networks operate at the internal, regional and international levels. The IOM points to forced begging as the most common form of exploitation in the country, along with domestic work, forced labour and smuggling for sexual exploitation. In 2018, 1,100 Senegalese migrants trying to reach Europe were identified as vulnerable to smuggling in Libya<sup>97</sup>. The National Unit for the Fight against Human Smuggling (CNLTP) of Senegal and the IOM work to improve information and care for victims of trafficking, although the task is complex and faces numerous limitations. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Organised Crime indicates that arrivals in southern Europe of sub-Saharan people (Senegalese, among them) through human trafficking and smuggling have remained stable over the last 10 years<sup>98</sup>.

After years of migration control policies, the 2020 surge in migration—in which the COVID 19 pandemic, economic problems and the strict control of other routes, among other factors<sup>99</sup>, converge—leads us to reconsider the effectiveness of the management system and controls established in Senegal with the support of the EU and its Member States.

<sup>93</sup> Barça (referring to F.C Barcelona) as the epitome of what Europe represents; and barzakh, a Wolof word that means what is after death, the afterlife. A free and simple translation could be 'migration or death'.

<sup>94</sup> The traditional wooden boats used for fishing in Senegal—known in Spain as cayucos—and which have been left without fishing activity due to Senegal's trade agreements with foreign powers (among them the EU) are now used to migrate.

Large fishmeal processing factories have continued to operate even during COVID-19 restrictions, affecting an already precarious situation. No measures were taken to protect the jobs of fishermen, fishmongers and women fish processors.

<sup>95</sup> 'Just one of the large European trawlers that operates in Senegal has nets of up to 600 meters, capturing in a single day what 50 small boats catch in a year'

GÓMEZ (2020) "Debates y controversias en la cooperación al desarrollo. Fondos privados de ayuda, acuerdos neocoloniales y ayuda a refugiados". [https://publicaciones.ua.es/libro/debates-y-controversias-en-la-cooperacion-al-desarrollo\\_124226/](https://publicaciones.ua.es/libro/debates-y-controversias-en-la-cooperacion-al-desarrollo_124226/)

<sup>96</sup> Idem

<sup>97</sup> It should not be forgotten that, in addition to the maritime route, control measures lead many people from or transiting from Senegal to migrate through the desert, where many die every year (more than 5,000 since 2014 according to the IOM). See: IOM (Webpage). Missing Migrants. <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/africa>

As a representative of Senegalese civil society informed us in an interview, given the inaction of the Senegalese authorities, the families of the victims have self-organised for searches and there have been significant social protests in this regard. The Senegalese youth mobilised on 13 November 2020, under the slogan #LeSenegalEnDeuil, with a day of mourning in protest of the lives lost on the Atlantic route.

<sup>98</sup> IOM (2019) *Lanzada la primera base de datos legales sobre casos de trata de personas en Senegal* <https://bit.ly/3pZ3wgh>

<sup>99</sup> The 2020 UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, pg. 135. It must be remembered that human trafficking in Europe represents profits of \$3 billion per year for criminal groups. It also estimates that some 55,000 migrants fall victim to trafficking each year from Africa to Europe, at a cost of €2,000 to €3,000 per person, which represents an income of €150 million for traffickers.

<sup>99</sup> Analysing the causes of the surge is complex since a variety of factors are involved. For more information see the 2021 CEAR report: "Migración en Canarias, la emergencia previsible", [https://www.cea.es/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Informe-CEAR\\_CANARIAS.pdf](https://www.cea.es/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Informe-CEAR_CANARIAS.pdf)

## Internment, expulsion and returns

Senegalese ranks fourth among nationalities with the highest number of admissions to CIEs in recent years<sup>100</sup>. At the same time, it has one of the lowest return rates: 5% of the 5,000 orders issued<sup>101</sup>.

Although Spain does not have an official readmission agreement with Senegal<sup>102</sup>, in practice, readmissions of people expelled from Spain have been taking place at least until 2018<sup>103</sup>.

Currently, despite the insistence of both the EU<sup>104</sup> and Spain to reach agreements in this regard, it is not expected that deportation flights will be resumed in the short term. Senegal is reluctant to collaborate on the return of its nationals since any visible action in this regard has a negative public impact. On the other hand, in addition to the social (and electoral) cost, accepting these readmissions could also affect the national economy given the economic weight of remittances<sup>105</sup>.

In terms of promoting voluntary return, the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security<sup>106</sup> has developed several projects. The number of people assisted for voluntary return to Senegal from Spain between 2010-2021 was higher than 400 according to the General Secretariat of Migration<sup>107</sup>. Regarding assistance provided to Senegalese returnees, the support of the IOM through a programme funded by the EUTF stands out<sup>108</sup>.

In Senegal, both voluntary and forced return has a high personal impact. It is perceived as a failure of the vital, individual, social and community project and often involves a complex process of reintegration into the communities, with family rejection and psychological problems being common<sup>109</sup>.

100 SPANISH ATTORNEY GENERAL (2020). *Memoria al gobierno de SM presentada al inicio del año judicial por la Fiscal General del Estado, Excm. Sra. D<sup>a</sup>. Dolores Delgado García*, Madrid. <https://bit.ly/3v74H1p>

The four top nationalities at CIEs were Moroccan (2,645), Algerian (1,922), Albanian (232) and Senegalese (218). The figures were similar in 2018, when 2,801 Moroccans were interned (35.66% of the total), 2,513 Algerians (31.99%), 418 Guineans (5.32%) and 320 Senegalese (4.07%). SJM (2020). Also see: CIE 2019 Report Annex. <https://bit.ly/33mWPNJ>

101 The rates were only lower for Guineans, Ivorians and Malians. European Commission. Overall figures of immigrants in European society (Webpage). <https://bit.ly/3pc146z>

102 Interview with the Spanish embassy in Senegal (24 September 2021).

For this investigation, the content of agreements and MoUs was requested through the Transparency Portal, but it was not provided to us.

103 EL PAÍS. 06/12/2006. *Acuerdo entre España y Senegal para frenar la inmigración*

[https://elpais.com/diario/2006/12/06/espana/1165359616\\_850215.html](https://elpais.com/diario/2006/12/06/espana/1165359616_850215.html)

EL DIARIO. 10/03/2021. *Interior cancela de nuevo el vuelo de deportación a Senegal de migrantes llegados a Canarias*. <https://bit.ly/3LAUcJb>

The Ombudsman reported on the increase in 'repatriations' to Senegal from Spain in 2018 due to the opening of a FRONTEX office. OMBUDSMAN (2019). *Informe 2018 MNP*. [https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Informe\\_2018\\_MNP.pdf](https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Informe_2018_MNP.pdf)

There is a significant lack of information available about the task of monitoring deportations from Spain and analysing their dimension and impact, which feeds concerns about the violation of rights in these operations. IRIDIA/NOV-ACT (2020). "Vulneración de los derechos humanos en las deportaciones". Pg. 66 <https://bit.ly/3pP13pW>

104 The EU considers that the political commitments on return and readmission are not being carried out effectively by the Senegalese government and insists on increasing the rate of return.

105 According to information from the IOM and the ANSD, the weight of remittances in Senegal's GDP has gone from 6% in 2001 to 13% in 2017. The main point of origin is France, with \$647 million in 2017, Italy (\$425 million) and Spain (\$302 million). Internal remittances from Africa are also significant: Gambia (\$264 million), Mauritania (\$130 million) and Gabon (\$116 million). In general, remittances are destined for domestic purposes, leaving behind business or investment initiatives that could be generated from this income.

OIM- ANSD (2019). *Migration au Sénégal: Profil Migratoire*. <https://bit.ly/3pQnk6W>

106 Interview with the Spanish embassy in Senegal (24 September 2021).

107 277 people through the productive return programme, 146 through the assisted voluntary return programme and 22 through the PREVAP project of IOM. Secretaría de Estado de Migraciones (web) Datos de retorno voluntario. [http://extranjeros.inclusion.gob.es/es/Retorno\\_voluntario/datos/index.html](http://extranjeros.inclusion.gob.es/es/Retorno_voluntario/datos/index.html)

108 The programme has served 5,342 people since 2017. Senegal EU-IOM Joint Initiative (2021) <https://bit.ly/3plxHir>

109 EL DIARIO. 18/12/2019. *La "vergüenza" de volver: los deportados luchan contra el estigma del 'fracaso' en Senegal*. [https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/deportados-senegaleses-luchan-estigma-fracaso\\_1\\_1162548.html](https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/deportados-senegaleses-luchan-estigma-fracaso_1_1162548.html)

## 5.2. Senegal as a country of destination and transit: The situation of migrants and refugees in Senegal

Senegal is also a country of transit and destination. 66% of the foreign population in Senegal comes from five countries in the region<sup>110</sup>. Internal and foreign migrants coexist, moving either for work, education<sup>111</sup> or economic reasons, or in search of international protection given the growing instability of other countries in the region<sup>112</sup>.

According to UNHCR data<sup>113</sup>, the total number of refugees in Senegal in mid-2021 was 14,505, with the vast majority coming from Mauritania (14,196)<sup>114</sup>.

**Table 6. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN SENEGAL**

International instruments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IV Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection Of Civilian Persons In Time Of War Of 12 August 1949 and its Protocols of 1977.</li> <li>• Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its protocol. (It is not part of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness).</li> <li>• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965.</li> <li>• OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969.</li> <li>• International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families of 1990.</li> <li>• Kampala Convention (African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa) of 2009 with entry into force in December 2012, 'for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons in Africa' as a response to the problem of internal displacement on this continent. It includes public and private actors as drivers of displacement.</li> </ul>
National legislation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asylum Law, 68/27 July 1968 amendment to the statute for refugees of 1969.</li> <li>• Law concerning the conditions of admission, residency and establishment of foreigners, 1971.</li> <li>• Law concerning the fight against human trafficking and practices for the protection of victims, 2005.</li> </ul>

The 1969 law on asylum and refuge (*Loi no. 68-27 de 24 juillet 1968 modifiée portant status des réfugiés*) is pending a much needed reform. As assistance from civil society organisations is not allowed, asylum application interviews are conducted by the State security forces, which in some cases generates distrust on the part of the applicants. The system for studying protection application files is very bureaucratic and inefficient, causing delays of years in resolving cases<sup>115</sup>. Protection decisions are made by a specific committee in which UNHCR can participate only as an observer. Negative resolutions are not based on legal grounds and, in the case of appeal, the review is carried out by the same committee that originally denied the application.

110 In particular Guinea (43%), Mali (10%), Gambia (7%) and Guinea-Bissau (6%) of the total foreign population, ASND - IOM (2019). *Migration au Senegal: Profile Migratoire* <https://publications.iom.int/books/migration-au-senegal-profil-national-2018>

111 Especially from countries that, like Senegal, belong to ECOWAS, since it establishes freedom of movement between member countries.

112 The countries bordering Senegal present very complicated situations that force people to migrate (Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Niger, etc.).

113 UNHCR (Statistics database). <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=kkK7Sr>

114 Due to ethnic conflicts since 1989, approximately 75,000 Mauritians were recognised prima facie in 1989 as refugees in Senegal according to data from UNHCR. Since the end of the conflicts and the beginning of reparation measures, many people have been returning to their country.

Since 2012, the Mauritanian government has maintained the position that the period of voluntary repatriation has ended, making, according to UNHCR, local integration and resettlement the most favourable solutions for the Mauritians still present in Senegal. UNHCR 12/01/2021. Senegal Multi-Country Office (MCO): <https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/208>

115 There are no specific procedures for the most vulnerable profiles, such as women or unaccompanied minors.

On the other hand, migrants are allowed to stay in the country even if the request is denied and no arrests related to the administrative situation of the migrant or refugee population have been detected<sup>116</sup>. Social organisations in Senegal advocate for an adequate reform of the asylum law. It is the Ministry of Finance that is currently in charge of the reform, which surprises and concerns civil society organisations regarding the direction it may take<sup>117</sup>.

In terms of assistance to refugees, UNHCR works together with the Senegalese National Committee for the Management of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (CNRRPD) and the National Eligibility Commission (CNE) to coordinate registration and protection activities<sup>118</sup>.

In 2020 in the context of the pandemic, UNHCR managed to convince the government to include asylum seekers and refugees in resilience measures in vulnerable households (electricity, food, water, etc...)<sup>119</sup>. Given their lack of options, those awaiting resolution are more likely to continue the migration journey along risky routes<sup>120</sup>.

Due to the lack of protection and opportunities in their countries of origin, thousands of people (especially Malian nationals in recent years)<sup>121</sup> arrive in Senegal with the aim of using it as a country of transit or embarkation on their journey to the so-called Atlantic route, with the final destination of the Canary Islands, the closest point of arrival to Europe and one of the deadliest routes. On this route, the figures of missing and deceased persons in 2021<sup>122</sup> was between the 955 counted by the IOM<sup>123</sup>, the 1,332 registered by the APDHA<sup>124</sup> and the 4,016 reported by Ca-Minando Fronteras<sup>125</sup>.

### 5.3. Conditionality in migration

Senegal's geostrategic position for containing migration flows is one of the aspects that makes it a priority partner for the EU and Spain. From 2006 to 2016, relations were consolidated that hint at the existence of migration conditionality in the cooperation between the two countries: Senegal would receive broad political support, development aid, trade investment, visas, etc. if it shares responsibility for managing migration flows.

The conditionality of the provision of aid in the form of Spanish ODA on border control in Senegal cannot be established directly, but the fluctuations in sums can be understood as a result of the migration context and relevant events (such as the so-called 'Cayucos crisis') being linked to a significant increase in ODA disbursements and bilateral diplomatic relations. The general purpose of the aid is in line with what we can call the genuine objectives of development cooperation. However, indicators such as the ones just mentioned do make us reflect on the risks of this conditionality occurring. As for the EU, as seen throughout this report, a considerable number of projects and ODA resources are allocated directly to the control of migration flows in Senegal as a country of origin and transit. In this case, it is not that the provision of aid is conditioned by Senegal behaving in a certain way, but that border control and mobility practices are directly funded with

116 GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, (2020) "Country profile Senegal" <https://bit.ly/3k994m8>

117 Interview with Amnesty International Senegal (19 May 2021).

118 UNHCR(2021) FactSheet. Senegal Multi-Country Office(MCO)12 January 2021 <https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/208>

119 UNHCR (2021). "Senegal year: Report 2020" <https://bit.ly/3mDA7YAr>

120 UNHCR (2019) "Decentralised Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Programme in Senegal (2017-2018)" <https://www.unhcr.org/5eb027774.pdf>

121 IOM-DTM (webpage). Senegal West and Central Africa. <https://dtm.iom.int/senegal>

122 2021 was the deadliest year on this route since data is available. CEAR. 29/12/2021. <https://www.cear.es/2021-el-ano-mas-letal-en-la-ruta-canaria-desde-que-se-conocen-datos/>

123 OIM (2021) *Missing Migrants project*. <https://bit.ly/3wjKxj8>

124 APDHA, (2022) "Balance migratorio en la Frontera Sur 2021" <https://bit.ly/3slc9NF>

125 Ca-Minando Fronteras (2022) "Informe Monitoreo Derecho a la vida 2021" <https://bit.ly/34GukdW>

ODA, with various EUTF projects standing out. The Senegalese organisations interviewed are very critical of these control practices: 'the ECOWAS states are being turned into ghettos of poverty from which one can't leave', commented one of the African civil society representatives interviewed. The ECOWAS zone, which allows the free movement of its citizens between its countries, is being affected by a series of controls that respond to the interests of the European Union to the detriment of the African countries. Thus, the imposition of European containment policies even prevents the development measures that regional organisations have been trying to implement for some time.

For its part, Senegal plays for both teams to an extent: on the one hand, it takes on commitments with the EU and its Member States to maintain their economic and political support, and on the other, it is reluctant to publicly accept collaboration on border control, especially with regard to the readmission of its nationals. This aspect is one of the main points of friction in the relationship between the EU and Senegal. The activists interviewed do not rule out the EU imposing some type of sanction on the Senegalese government to exert pressure against the interests of its citizens. This has already been announced in Gambia<sup>126</sup>.

There is increasing suspicion and social unrest regarding European interference in national affairs through prerogatives, such as development funds or the establishment of companies.

The future of EU and Spanish relations with Senegal depends on a balancing act: Senegal's resistance and difficulties in carrying out plans and fulfilling commitments with the EU represent a point of stress in the relationship that could lead to consequences or sanctions if the EU deems it necessary. This type of action could lead Senegal to tip the scales in favour of other non-EU partners for whom migration control is not so important (Kuwait, China, etc.). However, it is unlikely that the EU wants to run the risk of losing an ally as important as Senegal in this area up to now<sup>127</sup> and that the latter is capable, in turn, of giving up cooperation (including the large amounts of ODA that the EU and its member countries can offer it). These balances and dependencies, together with the growing economic and political instability and social protest in Senegal, may mark the type of relations that the EU and Member States can maintain with Senegal in the near future in terms of conditioning cooperation.

126 EL PAÍS, 25 October 2021, "La UE restringirá visados a ciudadanos de Gambia", <https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-10-25/gambia-paga-su-rechazo-a-repatriar-a-sus-nacionales.html>

127 The European Commissioner for Home Affairs has very recently offered Senegal the deployment of FRONTEX in the territory RFI. 11/02/2022. EU seeks to deploy border agency to Senegal <https://www.rfi.fr/en/eu-seeks-to-deploy-border-agency-to-senegal>

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

- The ODA it receives from the EU and its Member States, including Spain, is especially important for Senegal. It accepts commitments with the EU to maintain this support but is reluctant to accept (at least publicly) some key issues for the EU, such as the readmission of its nationals.
- As for the EU, the EUTF has played a key role in funding a large number of national and regional projects directly linked to migration and border control.
- Spanish Cooperation in Senegal is characterised by two aspects: work aimed at reducing poverty and inequality; and issues related to migration control and security measures. The latter are deployed mainly through cooperation delegated by the EU. In this regard, it is important to highlight the EU funds managed by FIIAPP and destined for projects related to migration with weighty security and control objectives. On the other hand, the projects executed by the AECID and development NGOs are generally aimed at improving the living conditions of the population.
- The correlation or conditionality of the provision of aid in the form of Spanish ODA on border control in Senegal cannot be established directly. In any case, it is important to bear in mind that conditionality may not be easily visible and may not only be related to monetary items for development cooperation but to other aspects such as investments, geostrategic alignments, or diplomatic relations. All this can have an impact when it comes to conditioning strategies and policies.
- Throughout this research, we experienced difficulties obtaining specific information on cooperation agreements, ODA budget items disbursed by the Ministry of the Interior, and expulsions, which denotes a lack of transparency in these matters.
- As for the future, we will have to pay attention to the balancing act and relationships of dependency between Senegal and its partner countries when fulfilling their commitments, which will affect the capacity of the EU and its member states to maintain or develop conditionality.

## ANNEXES:

## I. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL EUTF PROJECTS IN SENEGAL

Table Annex I. National EUTF projects in Senegal

Title	EUTF contribution	Implemented	Theme
Resilience of the most vulnerable populations in the face of nutritional and food crises in departure areas of Podor, Ranérou, Matam and Kanel	€ 8.000.000,00	AECID	Resilience strengthening
Normalising living conditions of populations directly affected by the Casamance conflict	€ 4.500.000,00	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Resilience strengthening
Strengthening food and nutrition security in the Matam region	€ 1.100.000,00	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement	Resilience strengthening
Strengthening the management and governance of migration, return and sustainable reintegration in Senegal, and accompanying the investments of the Senegalese diaspora	€ 27.900.000,00	AECID, Agence Française de Développement, OIM	Improving governance and conflict prevention
Employment development in Senegal: strengthening business competitiveness and employability in starting areas	€ 40.108.734,00	GRET a Solidarity and International Cooperation Association, Luxembourg Development Cooperation Agency, Agence Française de Développement, Positive Planet International	Greater economic and employment opportunities
Project to support the reduction of migration through the creation of rural jobs in Senegal, through the creation of individual and village farms	€ 20.000.000,00	MAECI DGCS - Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, AECID	Greater economic and employment opportunities
Project to support the reduction of rural migration and to support the reintegration through rural development in the Peanut Basin (PARERBA)	€ 18.000.000,00	ENABEL - Belgian Development Agency	Greater economic and employment opportunities
PASPED – Program to counteract illegal immigration through support to the private sector and job creation in Senegal	€ 14.303.200,00	CDP - Cassa depositi e prestiti Spa	Greater economic and employment opportunities
Support programme to strengthen the civil registration information system and consolidation of a national biometric identification database	€ 28.000.000,00	Civipol, ENABEL - Belgian Development Agency	Improving governance and conflict prevention
Joint Operational Partnership (POC) combating irregular immigration and trafficking in Senegal	€ 9.000.000,00	Civipol	Improving governance and conflict prevention
Total, national projects	€ 170.911.934,00		

Source: Own creation based on the information from the EUTF website.

**Table Annex I. REGIONAL EUTF PROJECTS IN SENEGAL**

Title	EUTF contribution (total, to all countries in the region)	Implemented	Theme
GAR-SI SAHEL	€ 66.600.000,00	FIIAPP. Spain leads a consortium with France, Italy, Portugal	Improving governance and conflict prevention
Erasmus+ en África Occidental	€ 10.000.000,00	Erasmus+ national agencies, under the supervision of DG Education and Culture (EAC)	Migration management
Sistema de seguimiento y aprendizaje para el EUTF Sahel y el lago Chad	€ 5.000.000,00	ALTAI	Migration management
Protección y soluciones sostenibles para personas migrantes y refugiadas a lo largo de la ruta del Mediterráneo Central	€ 125.000.000,00	IOM, ACNUR	Migration management
ARCHIPIÉLAGO: una iniciativa de EFTP africano-europea	€ 15.000.000,00	SEQUA, GmbH, EUROCHAMBRES and CPCCAF	Greater economic and employment opportunities
Apoyo a la protección de migrantes más vulnerables en África Occidental	€ 20.000.000,00	Spanish Red Cross, Save The Children, Caritas Switzerland	Protection and asylum
Support for entrepreneurs and very small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in West Africa (in support of the IPDEV-2 initiative)	€ 15.800.000,00	L'association I&P Entrepreneurs et Développement (IPED)	Legal migration and mobility
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 257.400.000</b>		

Source: Own creation based on the information from the EUTF website<sup>128</sup>.

128


128 European Commission (web) EUTF. <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/senegal>

## II REGIONAL FIIAPP PROJECTS IN SENEGAL

Table Annex II.- NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EUTF PROJECTS IN SENEGAL			
TITLE	Sponsor	Collaborators	Theme
Vocational training and sustainable tourism	European Commission	Banesto Cultural Foundation (Spain), Carlos III University	Economy and public finance
Support Programme for Inclusive African Public Policies (APIA)	AECID	AECID FIIAPP	Governance and modernisation of public administrations
Management and monitoring of Spanish Cooperation projects with West African States	AECID	AECID FIIAPP	Governance and modernisation of public administrations
Justice and Technical Assistance for the Directorate-General for Minors Identification Programme of the Senegalese Ministry of Justice	AECID	AECID FIIAPP	Justice
Assistance on migration in Senegal	AECID	Ministry of the Interior	Migration and mobility
Institutional Strengthening of the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) and its Member States in Migration and Development	AECID Fondo España-CE-DEAO sobre Migración y Desarrollo.	AECID FIIAPP	Migration and mobility
Project to support the third phase of the 'Rabat Process' – Migration	European Commission	MAEC	Migration and mobility
Action Plan of the Rabat Conference	European Commission	FIIAPP	Migration and mobility
Partnership for the management of professional migration	European Commission	GIP, ANPE, AFPA ANAEM, ACTIRIS IOM	Migration and mobility
MME – Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment	European Commission	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; FIIAPP	Migration and mobility
Cultural cooperation: ACERCA I, II and III Programme	AECID	AECID	Social policies and rights
Effective responses to the illegal production and trafficking of counterfeit medicines	European Commission	Ministry of the Interior - CNP	Social policies and rights
NETCOP Joint Operational Partnership (JOP) project to combat irregular immigration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Senegal	European Commission	FIIAPP CIVIPOL	Security, peace and development
Atlantic façade risk mitigation	European Commission	Direction Générale de la Sécurité Civile et de la Gestion de Crise (DGSCGC); INERIS Développement SAS and European Institute for Integrated Risk Management EU-Vri (EEIG)	Security and fight against organised crime
CBRN AFRICA Chemical and Biological Threats Project	European Commission	AENOR, CSIC	Security and fight against organised crime
SEACOP I: Port Cooperation Programme	European Commission	Interior	Security and fight against organised crime
Eradicating money laundering in West Africa	European Commission	CIVIPOL ADETEF FIAP	Security and fight against organised crime
(CBRN 24) Threats Project: identification of materials and protection of citizens	European Commission	UK police	Security and fight against organised crime
CBRN (33) Threats Project: African countries	European Commission	Ministry of the Interior	Security and fight against organised crime
CRIMGO Defence of critical maritime routes	European Commission	Ministry of the Interior	Security and fight against organised crime
Expert Mission on Money Laundering in West Africa (IoE Lot 6 – Req. 6)	European Commission	Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)	Security and fight against organised crime

CT Public Spaces	European Commission	Ministry of the Interior: Civil Guard, FIIAPP	Security and fight against organised crime
Expert support in the development of Lot 6 structures: Illegal traffic and organised crime: Drugs, weapons and illegal trafficking of human beings	European Commission	Ministry of the Interior FCI SOCA AEI Guardia di Finanza Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands Directorate for European and International Affairs representing the Dutch consortium 'Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior and National Police Force' CPS UKBA	Security and fight against organised crime
GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel)	European Commission	The International and Ibero-American Foundation for Public Administration and Public Policies Ministry of the Interior Civil Guard	Security and fight against organised crime
Fight against drug trafficking on the cocaine route	European Commission	Ministry of the Interior	Security and fight against organised crime
SEACOP I: Port Cooperation Programme	European Commission	Ministry of the Interior: National Police, Civil Guard	Security and fight against organised crime
Production of the annual report on finance and development in Africa		Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale	
Source: Own creation based on the information from the EUTF website			

### III. EXPULSIONS/RETURNS FROM THE EU TO SENEGAL



Source: Eurostat 2021 (Migr\_Eiord and Migr\_Eirtn data sets), Own Creation

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